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KELAKUAN TAK RASIONAL PELABUR-PELABUR DAN IMPAKNYA 
TERHADAP PERGERAKAN HARGA SAHAM : BUKTI DARIPADA BURSA 
MALAYSIA 
  
ABSTRAK 
Adakah Hipotesis Pasaran Efisien (EMH) masih wujud dalam dunia nyata sekiranya 
andaian  rasionaliti tidak lagi bertahan?  Oleh sebab pasaran terdiri daripada manusia, 
adalah logik bahawa penjelasan yang berakar pada sifat psikologi pelabur dapat 
menerangkan kelakuan pasaran saham.  Penyelidikan ini cuba menggunakan kaedah 
kajian peristiwa untuk mengkaji sama ada kelakuan tak rasional pelabur dapat 
menerangkan pergerakan harga saham. Terdapat empat dapatan utama daripada kajian 
ini.  Pertama, pelabur Malaysia adalah berpacu perhatian. Kelakuan pelaburan mereka 
adalah bias kepada peristiwa “rebut-perhatian” iaitu volum dagangan harian tak normal 
dan perubahan ekstrim dalam harga saham harian. Kedua, keputusan pelabur 
memperlihatkan sifat rujukan bersandar.  Mereka menggunakan harga 52-minggu 
tertinggi dan harga 52-minggu terendah sebagai titik rujukan untuk membantu mereka 
membuat keputusan dagangan pelaburan. Walau bagaimanapun, pelabur tidak bias 
kepada “heuristik perwakilan” ataupun “heuristik kesediadaan”. Ketiga, strategi berasas-
perhatian tidak menjana pulangan tak normal positif kecuali bagi strategi pembelian 
portfolio saham jenis rugi. Akhir sekali, harga 52-minggu tertinggi dan harga 52-minggu 
terendah boleh mempengaruhi pulangan portfolio. Portfolio yang harga sahamnya lebih 
(kurang) daripada harga 52-minggu tertinggi (52-minggu terendah) berpretasi rendah 
(tinggi) berbanding pasaran dalam tempoh berikutnya. Dapatan kajian ini memberi 
beberapa implikasi terhadap teori kewangan. Pelabur adalah tidak rasional. Sifat 
psikologi pelabur cenderung membawa kepada dagangan pelaburan berlebih-lebihan 
dalam pasaran. Keadaan ini mencabar andaian rasionaliti EMH. Strategi asas-perhatian 
 xvii
terutamanya pembelian portfolio saham rugi menghasilkan pulangan tak normal positif 
dalam jangka pendek, tetapi pulangan prospektif lesap secara otomatik dalam jangka 
masa yang lebih panjang. Dengan ini, disimpulkan bahawa pasaran saham Malaysia 
kekal cekap dalam jangka masa panjang. 
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THE IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF INVESTORS AND ITS IMPACT ON 
STOCK PRICE MOVEMENTS : EVIDENCE FROM BURSA MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) still alive in the real world if the rationality 
assumption does not hold? Since markets consist of human beings, it seems logical that 
explanations rooted in the psychological attributes of investors would shed some light on 
stock market behaviour. This research attempts to use the event study methodology to 
investigate whether investors’ irrational behaviour could explain stock price movement. 
There are four main findings of this study. Firstly, Malaysian investors are attention-
driven. Their trading behaviour is biased toward attention-grabbing events, namely daily 
abnormal trading volume and daily extreme price changes. Secondly, investors’ 
judgement exhibits reference dependence. They use 52-week high and 52-week low as a 
reference point to guide them in making trading decisions. However, investors are not 
biased by representativeness and availability heuristics. Thirdly, attention-based 
strategies do not generate positive abnormal returns except for the strategy of buying 
portfolios of loser-stocks. Lastly, 52-week high and 52-week low seem to affect 
portfolio returns. Portfolios whose current stock price exceeds (fall below) its 52-week 
high (52-week low) underperform (outperform) the market in the subsequent period. The 
results of this study have some implications on financial theories. Investors are 
irrational. The psychological attributes of investors tend to cause excessive trading in the 
market. This could give a serious challenge to the rationality assumption of the EMH. 
Attention-based strategies, especially that of buying portfolios of loser-stocks yield 
positive abnormal returns in the short-run, but the promising returns automatically 
disappear in the longer horizon. Hence, we conclude that Malaysian market remain 
 xix
efficient in the long run.  
 1
 Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Study 
The stock market is an important component of a country’s capital market. It is the place  
where stocks are traded with a view of generating long-term funds for corporations to 
make future investment and expansion. According to Toporoswki (2000), the stock 
market encourages the efficiency and profitability of firms, thereby supporting the 
country’s economic development and progress in general. In addition, the performance 
of the stock market has a direct wealth effect not only on the investors’ expenditure 
decisions but also their confidence level. As the value of stocks goes up, wealth as well 
as the confidence level of investors goes up, which in turn encourages investors to 
increase their expenditure and investment that can reduce unemployment and boost the 
economic growth. Conversely, if the stock market is performing poorly, this tends to 
lower investors’ wealth  and confidence level, and this eventually has an adverse impact 
on the economy.  
In practice, the stock market is an extremely exciting place. The Malaysian stock 
market is of no exception. It attracts people from all walks of life despite the fact that 
investing is a difficult process. These people include businessmen, professionals, 
executives, clerks, odd job workers, retirees, hawkers as well as housewives. Some of 
them have the knowledge of investing while others are ignorant about the stock markets. 
However, there is one significant similarity among these investors. All of them are 
attempting to maximize profits.  
 In view of the importance of the stock market, we have seen a voluminous 
amount of finance literature attempting to search for clues as to why the market behaves 
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as it does  around the world for the past three decades. Most of the theoretical and 
empirical studies in financial economics are carried out based on the concept of market 
efficiency. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that stock prices fully reflect 
all the available information. When information arises, the news is transmitted very 
speedily and instantaneously and is incorporated into the stock prices without much 
delay. EMH rules out the possibility of making abnormal returns using trading strategy 
that are based on currently available information. The efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970) is also associated with the idea of a “random walk” where price changes 
are random and unpredictable. If EMH holds, investors are encouraged  to hold well-
diversified portfolios and thus, adopt passive money management. 
 Shleifer (2000) stresses that EMH, basically, rests on three major assumptions.  
Firstly, investors are assumed to be rational. Secondly, even if some of the investors do 
not behave in a rational manner, their actions are assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated, hence offsetting each other without affecting stock prices.  Thirdly, if 
investors are irrational in the same manner, they would cause the stock to deviate from 
its equilibrium value. Rational arbitrageurs would then take advantage of this temporary 
profit making opportunities and eventually, stabilize the stock prices.  
 Early studies provide evidence favouring Efficient Market Hypothesis [e.g. Fama 
(1965), Jensen (1978)]. Stock prices seem to follow a random walk model. Even if there 
are predictable variations in the stock returns, they were found to be statistically and 
economically insignificant. This implies that passive money management is the most 
appropriate approach investors should adopt.  
 However, in the last twenty years, EMH has been challenged on its empirical 
grounds because of the accumulating evidence on the stock return predictability. For 
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instance, high volume return premium where stocks experiencing unusually high (or 
low) trading volume tend to appreciate (or depreciate) in  subsequent periods [Gervais, 
Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001); Hiemstra and Jones (1994); Hoontrakul (1995); Kaniel, 
Li and Starks (2003); Parisi and Acevedo (2001)], winner-loser effect where winner-
stocks (or loser-stocks) tend to underperform (or outperform) the market in subsequent 
periods [Ahmad and Hussain (2001); Ariffin and Power (1996); DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987); Dissanaike (1997); Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga (2004), Mun, Vasconcellos 
and Kish (2000)], momentum effect where winner-stocks (or loser-stocks) continue to 
outperform (or underperform) the market in subsequent periods [Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996); Grundy and Martin (2000); Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); Shefrin 
(2000)]  and post-earnings-announcement drift anomaly means stocks tend to earn 
abnormally high (or low) returns following positive (or negative) earnings surprises 
[Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Ball and Brown (1968); Bernard and Thomas (1990); 
Cheung and Sami (2000); Sun (2005)].   
Recent accumulating evidences suggest that stock prices can be predicted with a 
fair degree of reliability. Two competing explanations have been offered for such a 
phenomenon.  Proponents of EMH [for instance, Fama and French (1995)] continue to 
hold on to the notion that stock markets are efficient. They claim that such predictability 
is the result of the time-varying risks where higher expected returns are required to 
compensate for the higher level of risks undertaken.  Critics against the EMH [for 
instance, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shliefer and Vishnu (1997)] argue that the predictability 
of stock returns are due to the irrational component of investors such as psychological 
biases, social movements, noise trading and fads in a speculative market.  In fact, some 
of these anomalies can be explained by elements of prospect theory [see Camerer, C.F. 
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(1998)]. 
In addition to the empirical challenges, EMH has also been subjected to critical 
re-examination on its theoretical grounds. The rationality assumption of EMH does not 
seem to hold in practice. Black (1986) provides evidence that investors do not make 
trading decisions based on fundamental information. Instead, they trade on noise. In 
reality, they fail to diversify [Barber and Odean (2000); Goetzmann and Kumar (2002); 
Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum (1974); and Scharbaum, Lewellen, and Lease (1978)]. 
They actively identify certain stock price patterns and churn their portfolios accordingly, 
for instance, they sell winner-stocks and hold on to loser-stocks [Dhar and Zhu (2002); 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Jackson (2003); Odean (1998a); Shapiro and Venezia 
(2001) and Shefrin and Statman (1985);]. They tend to buy stocks that catch their 
attention [Barber and Odean (2003); Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers and Teoh (2002); and 
Lee (1992)]. In short, investors do not seem to pursue the passive strategies as is 
expected by the efficient markets theory. They appear to invest in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the paradigm of rationality. According to Shefrin (2000), investors 
commit errors in the course of making investment decisions and these errors cause the 
stock prices to deviate from what they would have been in an error-free environment. 
 From the behavioural perspective, Bernard Baruch in Tvede (1999) states that 
what registers in the stock market’s fluctuations are not solely the events themselves but 
also the reactions of investors toward these events,  playing an important part in the 
stock markets. How millions of individual investors perceive these happenings will 
determine their beliefs, which in turn shape their emotions and influence their demand 
which may then affect the future movements of the stock market. After all, the stock 
market is made up  of people (i.e. investors).  Thus, the stock prices do not just express 
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simple supply and demand equilibria which reflects their fundamental values. They also 
include a psychological element (i.e. the behaviour of investors participating in the stock 
price formation) which should not be neglected.  
The existing studies often view event as an exogenous factor and assume that 
investors are rational and can process the event or information speedily and 
instantaneously without  bias. Whenever events occur in the market, the information is 
public. However, its effect will not be incorporated into stock prices until the 
information reaches investors with certain strength and enters their mind which 
ultimately affects their beliefs and influences their trading behaviour. Therefore, this 
research attempts to fill this gap by treating investors’ information structure as 
endogenous factor and analyzing investors’ decision making process, the way investors 
react to event and process information before a decision is made as a result of their 
limited cognitive abilities.   
 Nofsinger (2002) has stressed in his book entitled “The Psychology of Investing” 
that psychologists have known for a long time that people in general, and investors in 
particular often act in an irrational manner and make predictable errors in their forecasts. 
This, indeed, can affect investors’ investing and ultimately their wealth. He also 
highlights that the human brain does not work like a computer. Rather, it analyses 
information through shortcuts and emotional filters whether with or without their 
realisation in order to shorten analysis time and make quicker decision. He has termed 
these filters and shortcuts as psychological biases. Through this process, the resulting 
decision is no longer rational as what the traditional theories expect. As a result, a new 
branch of capital market analysis, behavioural finance has emerged, attempting to enrich 
our understanding of financial markets by adding human element into the asset pricing 
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models. 
 The proponents of behavioral finance including Shefrin (2000) contend that a 
few psychological phenomena, for instance, heuristic-driven bias and framing effects, 
pervade the entire landscape of finance. Investors depend on heuristic or rule of thumb 
to process data. Rules of thumb are generally imperfect. Therefore, investors hold biased 
beliefs which predispose them to make mistakes. In addition, investors do not view the 
investment decisions through the transparent and objective lens of risk and returns. Their  
perceptions of risk and returns are highly influenced by how decision problems are 
framed. The heuristic-driven bias and framing effects cause stock prices to deviate from 
their fundamental values, thus making the financial markets inefficient. These explain 
how behavioral finance differs from the traditional finance.  
 So far, the modern capital market theories, for examples, the modern portfolio 
theory, the capital asset pricing model and the arbitrage pricing theory, have failed us 
because they have not admitted that human behaviors are irrational and emotional. They 
have also neglected the psychological elements (for instance, reference dependence, 
representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, herding and etc.) which play a crucial 
role in the stock markets. In fact, the best way to deduce the market’s movement in the 
future is to identify the degree of disequilibrium between market prices and participants’ 
psychological biases. Shefrin (2000) believes that investors can make handsome return 
by estimating the errors of others in the stock markets. The proper study of markets is, in 
fact, the study of human behaviour. 
 Logically speaking, the stock price movements cannot be merely attributable to 
events themselves, but also the irrational component of the investors. In a market 
consisting of humans, it would be logical to suggest that explanations rooted in human 
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and social psychology would enhance our understanding of stock market behaviour.  
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Figure 1.1 
Investor Base of Bursa Malaysia for the Year 1993 to 2008. 
Source : Bursa Malaysia Berhad (2009) Financial Results for 2008, p.31. 
 
According to the survey conducted by Bursa Malaysia in 1998 on the equity 
distribution of companies as listed on its Official List as at 31 December 1997, 
individuals represent the largest group of investors (which account for 87.9% of total 
investors) in the Malaysian stock market, followed by nominees and institutions which 
represent only 9.1% and 2.8% of total investors respectively. In the development 
discussion paper of Harwood (1993), he presents the investor base of Malaysian stock 
market for 1991 and shows that institutions (44 percent) and nominees (36 percent) were 
the dominant shareholders in terms of value of equity held, while individuals held only 
16 percent. According to Figure 1.1, statistics in the financial results of Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad for the year 2008 demonstrate that retail participation in terms of value of equity 
held has been increasing from year 1993 till year 2003. Subsequently, there is a drop in 
retail participation due to weak investor sentiment. Based on the statistics here, we have 
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sufficient evidence to support that retail investors are the major and significant group of 
investors in Bursa Malaysia in particular during the study period from 1993 till 2004. 
In view of this investor profile, many professional analysts believe that 
Malaysian stock market is dominated by many irrational “noise traders” who respond to 
sentiment and fads. Furthermore, they also believe that the investors in Malaysia are less 
sophisticated compared to their counterparts in developed markets mainly due to the 
limited access to information pertaining to the stock market. In addition, there is also a 
number of studies [for example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); Hand (1990); and Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991)] that state that individual investors are less sophisticated 
compared to institutional investors and individual investors’ trading behaviours could be 
a source of market inefficiencies. Thus, there have always been questions about whether 
the Malaysian stock market is manipulated and dominated by rumours. In line with this 
opinion, Md. Isa and Lim (1995) conduct a survey pertaining to the investors’ 
demographics and investment characteristics in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya area. 
The survey was conducted over an eight week period in the beginning of 1992 through 
personal interviews and self-administered drop-off method. The results show that 
investors in Malaysia are those in the middle and upper economic class with a 
respectable level of education, career and income. However, Md. Isa and Lim (1995) in 
their study highlight that majority of the investors are in fact speculators in the market.  
 Moreover, most recent studies [see Ahmad and Tjan (2004); Hameed and Ting 
(2000); Husni (2005); Lai (2002), Lai, Krishnan and Mat Nor (2003); Mohd Arifin and 
Power (1996) and Nam, Pyun and Kim (2003)] document that the phenomena of 
overreaction and momentum do exist in the Malaysian stock market and they interpret 
this evidence as a manifestation of the irrational behaviour of Malaysian investors. 
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 1.2. Problem Statement 
There seems to be two groups of academic researchers, in which one continues to 
support the efficient market hypothesis [see Dimson and Mussavian (1998); Fama and 
French (1995); and Malkiel (2003)] which assert that stock markets are efficient and rule 
out the possibility of trading strategies based only on the currently available information 
that could yield excess returns. The other criticises the rationality assumption of the 
EMH [see La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishnu (1997)] and suggests that stock 
returns can be predicted with a fair degree of reliability due to the irrational behaviour of 
investors.  
Since markets consist of human beings, it seems logical that explanations rooted 
in the psychological attributes of investors would shed some light on stock market 
behaviour. Moreover, the assumption of rationality under the EMH paradigm seems to 
be too “ideal” to be applicable in the real world. In many occasions, it failed to explain 
the behaviour of stock prices. The evidence in many psychology studies show that 
humans possess many psychological biases which prevent them from being fully and 
truly rational. When evaluating risky investment, investors do not look at the final 
wealth, instead they determine the possibility of a gain or loss relative to some reference 
points [see Kahneman and Riepe (1998)]. In addition, loss aversion also influences 
investors to make irrational decisions [see Shefrin and Statman (1985)].  In view of the 
limited mental processing abilities, investors use heuristic to simplify the complexity of 
decision making situations and in many cases, it leads investors to arrive at inaccurate 
conclusion and subsequently, make investment decision which is not optimal [see 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Tversky and Kahneman (1974)]. Furthermore, 
many investors exhibit herd behaviour [see Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang, Chen 
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and Khorana (2000)]. They make investment decisions according to the feel of herd 
rather than the rigours of formal analysis.  
  The traditional theory assumes investors are rational. Thus, it makes sense to 
study only the events that are happening in the stock market and view the information as 
an exogenous factor in order to understand stock price movement. However, investors 
are found to be irrational in real life. As such, it seems logical to view investors’ 
information structure endogenously to shed some light on stock price behaviour. 
Whenever events occur, the information is public. Its effect will not be incorporated into 
stock prices until the information reaches investors with certain strength. It then enters 
their mind and influences their beliefs which eventually determine their trading 
behaviour. Therefore, stock prices do not just reflect public information, but also 
investors’ behaviour, in particular, the irrational behaviour of investors. 
The problem associated with irrational behaviour of investors is that stock prices 
do not reflect their fundamental value as the market valuation is distorted by the 
irrational thinking of investors. This is well-demonstrated in the prevailing market 
scenario. As was reported in The Edge newspaper dated 16 February 2009, we witnessed 
the freefall in the stock market during the current global economic crisis as investors shy 
away from the market. In view of the panic selling of investors and the negative market 
sentiment, stock prices have continued to drop and they do not reflect the fundamental 
values anymore. As a result, some companies with strong fundamental ground, for 
instance IOI Properties Berhad, become victims of the irrational behaviour of investors 
where its stock price no longer reflects a fair value. 
The Malaysian stock market has been on a roller coaster ride. In 1993, the 
benchmark Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) surpassed the 1,000 mark hurdle 
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(i.e. 1,275.32 points). Due to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the KLCI slumped by 
more than 500 points within six months. In August 1998, the KLCI slumped to its lowest 
ever level (261.33 points). By the end of 2000, the KLCI rebounded to 974.38 points. In 
November 2006, the KLCI succeeded to exceed the 1,000 mark hurdle (1,090 points) for 
first time since 2000. At the end of 2007, the KLCI reached an all time high of 1,466.67 
points. After the March 2008 General Elections, the KLSE fell below 900 points for first 
time since 2006. 
Events such as the 1998 stock market crash and the current demise in the stock 
market have raised doubts about the traditional assumption that the stock market is 
efficient in the sense that actual prices correspond to fundamental prices. Dramatic 
fluctuations in the stock market raise questions about whether actual asset prices 
correspond to the expected present value of future cash flows, and whether or not, the 
stock market is always efficient in pricing securities. If stock market inefficiencies do 
occur, what, if any, are the possible real consequences? 
Studies looking  at the behavioural aspects of the markets are still very lacking 
particularly in the developing countries like Malaysia. This could be even more 
applicable in Malaysia given the low level of market sophistication as well as the 
characteristics and profile of Malaysian investors. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
The central research question being investigated is : “Could Malaysian investors’ 
irrational behaviour explain stock price movement?”  This question can be investigated 
under four specific questions, namely : 
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1. Are Malaysian investors attention-driven ? 
2. Do the psychological attributes of Malaysian investors (such as reference 
dependence, representativeness heuristics, and availability heuristics) influence 
their trading behaviour? 
3. Do attention-based strategies provide profitable investment opportunities for 
Malaysian investors? 
4. Do psychological attributes explain stock price movement? 
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
Accordingly, the research objectives are : 
1. To investigate whether or not Malaysian investors are attention-driven.  
2. To determine whether the psychological attributes of Malaysian investors 
influence their trading behaviour. 
3. To examine whether attention-based strategies provide profit making 
opportunities for Malaysian investors. 
4. To analyse the effect of psychological elements on stock price movement. 
 
1.5. Significance and Contributions of Study 
The results of the research have both their theoretical and empirical significance. Firstly, 
they build on research in behaviourial finance which is still very young even in the 
developed markets and especially in the emerging markets, where this area of research is 
very much lacking. 
Secondly, if the results of the study demonstrate the existence of psychological 
attributes in the market, they help to increase awareness among investors (whether 
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individuals or institutions) about specific behaviourial tendencies and how they can 
skew their decision making. Thus, investors will be better off in dealing with such 
psychological biases and improve their investment strategies. For fund managers and 
financial advisers, they will be more effective at giving advice to the clients if they have 
a better grasp of investor psychology. 
 Thirdly, exploring different psychological attributes may also help to determine 
the psychological attribute which is more predominant in the market. Thus, policy 
makers of corporations will be better off in handling public announcement on earnings 
information or other corporate exercises to avoid negative impact on the market 
sentiment. It also helps to prevent unnecessary turmoil from happening. 
 Fourthly, the results of the research may also provide evidence on the role of 
behaviourial factors in influencing trading volume. It helps to extend our understanding 
of the causes of the generally high level of trading volume as well as the well-
documented winner-loser effect and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). 
 Fifthly, the results of the study may help to determine whether the rationality 
assumption holds in the real world. If the rationality assumption does not hold, the 
results of the study may also provide evidence whether the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
is still applicable in the real world.  
 Sixthly, the results of the study may also help to determine whether human 
psychology could explain the behaviour of markets better and help to gauge the validity 
of the Prospect Theory.  
 Finally, by incorporating short-selling prohibition in the study may provide 
evidence on the role of short-selling prohibition in influencing investors’ trading 
behaviour. It helps to extend our understanding of the impact of short-selling prohibition 
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on market liquidity.  
 
1.6. Chapter Scheme 
This research is organised as follow: Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the study. It 
contains the problem statement, research questions, objectives of the study, scope of 
study and the significance and contribution of the study. Apart from this introductory 
chapter, there are in total six other chapters. The related literature and previous research 
that are relevant to the study are discussed in chapter 2. Thereafter, the research 
framework and the hypotheses, which are constructed from the research problems 
formulated are presented in Chapter 3. 
 Chapter 4 explains in detail the steps taken to empirically examine the research. 
The results of the finding are presented in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 discusses the findings 
and provides the potential explanation of the findings. Finally, Chapter 7 recapitulates 
the study by briefly reviewing the objective and the findings of study. The conclusions 
are then given. The limitations and the implications of study are also presented. The 
chapter ends with a suggestion of further research needed in this area. 
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The literature review related to the research objectives of this study will be discussed in 
this chapter. This chapter reviews literature on efficient market hypothesis and the 
behavioural aspects of investors. The rest of this chapter is divided into eight sections. 
Section 2.2 briefly discussed the definition and the different levels of EMH. The 
underlying assumptions of EMH and how it has been challenged on its theoretical 
ground are presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes the empirical evidences in 
favour of EMH, followed by the market anomalies that were detected by researchers in 
recent years. Empirical studies relating EMH and the anomalies that were detected on 
Bursa Malaysia are presented separately in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 briefly reviews the 
prospect theory developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979). The theory 
describes  the way how decisions are actually made by investors under conditions of 
uncertainty.  It also highlights the major similarities and differences between prospect 
theory and expected utility theory. Literature on the psychology of real-world investors 
is presented in Section 2.7. It discusses a number of psychological biases that are 
exhibited by investors and the decision-making process of investors. Lastly, Section 2.8 
summarises the chapter.  
 
2.2. The Definition and the Different Levels of EMH  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EMH is associated with the idea of random 
walk where all successive price changes represent random departures from previous 
prices. In other words, tomorrow’s price change will only reflect tomorrow’s news and 
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will not depend on today’s price changes. By definition, the news is unpredictable and 
thus, the resulting price changes must also be unpredictable and random in character. 
The term “efficient capital market” was first mentioned in Fama’s (1965) paper. 
Generally, it is believed that stock markets are efficient in reflecting information [which 
include good or bad news] pertaining to the individual stocks. When information arises, 
the news will be transmitted very rapidly and eventually incorporated into the stock 
prices without interruptions and delay. 
  The EMH is traditionally divided into three levels [see Fama (1970)]. The first 
level i.e. the weak-form of EMH suggests that past market data cannot be used to predict 
future stock price movements. Rather, stock prices follow what is known as a “random 
walk”. In other words, price movements will not follow any particular patterns or trends. 
Thus, past stock information cannot serve as a basis for making above-average risk 
adjusted return. It implies that technical analysis [which uses past sequence of stock 
price and the volume information as the basis for predicting future stock prices] will not 
be able to produce abnormal returns. The semi-strong form efficiency states that any 
publicly available information is rapidly transmitted and processed by the market. Thus, 
no investor can make above-average risk adjusted return on the basis of public 
information. It implies that fundamental analysis [which involves using market 
information to determine the intrinsic value of stocks in order to identify those stocks 
that are undervalued (or overvalued) and are expected to rise (or fall) in the future] will 
not be able to produce abnormal returns. The strong-form of EMH asserts that any 
information, whether privately or publicly held, provides no basis for making abnormal 
return. The implication of this is that not even insider knowledge can be used to 
outperform the market.  
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 In short, the EMH implies that investors cannot predictably outperform the 
market either with stock selection or with market timing. Changes in stock prices are 
expected to be random and unpredictable. This has very important implications for many 
investment strategies. EMH asserts that none of the investment strategies are effective. 
Even if the investment strategies yield capital gains, the gains will not be economically 
sufficient to cover the transaction and research costs incurred. Thus, investors are 
advised to follow a passive investment strategy which makes no attempt to outperform 
the market. In order to optimise returns, investor should have a superior strategy which 
is randomly diversified across stocks, incurring minimal information and transaction 
costs. In addition, even portfolio managers would not be able to help adding value to 
investors. 
 
2.3. The Underlying Assumptions of EMH 
As documented by Shleifer (2000), EMH, basically, rests on three major assumptions.  
Firstly, investors are assumed to be rational and thus they value the stocks in a rational  
manner. Investors value each stock based on its fundamental value. They would discount 
the stock’s future cash flows at a rate which reflects their risk characteristics. Investors 
would quickly respond to the new information pertaining to the fundamental values of 
the stocks. Their actions of either buying  or selling would exert pressure on the stocks 
by pushing the stock prices up (or down) when the news is good (or bad). Secondly, 
even if some of the investors do not behave in a rational manner, their actions are 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated, hence they would offset each other without 
affecting stock prices.  Thirdly, if investors are irrational in the same manner, they 
would cause the stock to deviate from its equilibrium value. Thus, the stock would either 
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be undervalued or overvalued. This temporary profit making opportunity would attract 
rational arbitrageurs who will then stabilize the stock prices. If these assumptions are not 
met, the dominant paradigm in the financial market research (i.e. EMH) will no longer 
be valid. 
 In the first decade after its conception in the 1960s, the EMH has achieved 
enormous theoretical and empirical success. Many asset pricing theories were 
subsequently developed on the basis of the EMH and its applications. However, in 
recent year, EMH has been subjected to critical re-examination on its theoretical 
grounds. First of all, the rationality assumption of EMH does not seem to hold in 
practice. Black (1986) provides evidence that investors do not make trading decisions 
based on fundamental information. Instead, they trade on noise. Ideally, investors are 
advised to follow strictly to the guidance of financial gurus. However, in real life, they 
fail to diversify [Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum (1974); Barber and Odean (2000); 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2002); and Scharbaum, Lewellen, and Lease (1978)]. They 
actively identify certain stock price patterns and churn their portfolios accordingly, for 
instance, they sell winner-stocks and hold on to loser-stocks [Dhar and Zhu (2002); 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Jackson (2003); Odean (1998a); Shapiro and Venezia 
(2001); Shefrin and Statman (1985)]. They tend to buy stocks that catch their attention 
[see Lee (1992); Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers and Teoh (2002); and Barber and Odean 
(2003)]. In short, investors do not seem to pursue the passive strategies as what is 
expected by the efficient markets theory. They appear to invest in a manner that is not 
compatible with the paradigm of rationality. 
 As summarised by Kahneman and Riepe (1998), investors tend to deviate from 
the standard decision making model when making investment decisions. Firstly, 
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individual investors do not look at the final wealth they attain when evaluating any risky 
investment. They instead look at gains or losses relative to some reference points. A 
reference point is the stock price that investors compare with the current stock price.  
The possible reference points are the purchase price, the mean and median price of the 
past year, the 52-week high and 52-week low price and etc.  The investors’ choice of a 
reference point plays an important role  because it determines whether they feel the 
pleasure of obtaining a profit or the pain of a loss. The reference point may vary from 
time to time according to the situation without any regard to the ‘true’ value of the 
stocks. Investors also display loss aversion which was first described and modelled by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their ‘Prospect theory.’ Prospect theory is a 
psychologically realistic alternative to expected utility theory. It describes how people 
make choices under conditions of uncertainty. Starting from empirical evidence, the 
theory describes how individuals gauge potential losses and gains. Odean (1998a) 
provides evidence which demonstrates that investors are reluctant to sell stocks that lose 
value. This finding is consistent with the notion of loss aversion. 
 Secondly, investors systematically deviate from the principles of Bayes rule 
when making future prediction [see Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974)]. Under the conditions of uncertainty, investors often make prediction 
on future events by taking a short history of data and using this shortcut to attempt to 
describe the composite picture. It can be  representativeness- or availability-heuristic. 
Under representativeness heuristic, investors judge the probability of an event by finding 
a ‘comparable known’ event and assuming that the probabilities will be similar.  On the 
other hand, availability heuristic suggests that investors make judgement based on recent 
event that they can remember rather than complete data. Such heuristics are very useful. 
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They help investors in identifying specific patterns in the data, as well as saving on 
computation. Nonetheless, heuristic has its flaws. It may lead investors to deduce 
inaccurate conclusion and subsequently, make investment decision which is not optimal. 
For instance, when investors are biased by representativeness heuristics, they may 
overprice the glamorous stocks which  exhibit a history of rapid earnings growth. Such 
overreaction lowers the returns in the future as the past growth rates fail to repeat 
themselves and thus, the stock price falls to a more plausible valuations.  On the other 
hand, if investors are biased by availability heuristics, they may overreact to the recent 
event (either an extremely large positive or negative earnings surprises). They then 
demonstrate disproportionate amount of buying (or selling) activity following an 
extremely large positive (or negative) earnings surprises.   
 The second assumption of EMH is that while irrational investors may exist, their 
actions are random and hence cancel each other. In fact, the noise traders would not 
trade stocks randomly, but rather many of them would be keeping their eyes and ears 
open to what other investors are doing. They follow each other’s mistakes by listening to 
rumours and imitating the actions of other investors. This is known as “herding 
behaviour”. The problem associated with moving with the herd is that it magnifies the 
psychological biases (Shiller 1984). It causes investors to act in an irrational manner (i.e. 
make the same buying or selling decision based on the observations of others, 
independent of their own knowledge and beliefs). Practically, the investment decisions 
are made based on the ‘feel’ of the herd rather than analysing the stocks’ fundamental 
values deliberately. This is in contrast to the classical view that investors trade merely 
according to the fundamental information. 
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Finally, Shleifer and Summers (1990) posit that the assumption of riskless 
arbitrage is not realistic. In contrast to the EMH, real-world arbitrage is risky and hence 
limited.  In real life, stocks do not have close substitutes. If for some reasons stocks are 
mispriced (i.e. either underpriced or overpriced), there is no riskless hedge for the 
arbitrageur. Arbitrage does not help to push down (or up) the stock price even if they are 
overpriced (or underpriced) (Figlewski 1979, Campbell and Kyle 1993).  Arbitrageurs 
who perceive that stocks are overpriced, are unable to sell stocks short and buy a 
substitute stock, since such  stock does not exist.  Instead they may simply sell or reduce 
exposure to stocks attempting to get an excess market return. According to Siegel 
(1998),  this arbitrage is no longer risk free. Moreover, if the arbitrageurs are risk-averse, 
their interest in such arbitrage will also be limited.  
 
2.4. The Empirical Studies Relating to EMH 
The formulation of EMH has prompted considerable empirical research attempting to 
determine whether financial markets are efficient and, if so, to what extent are their 
information processing efficiency. Most of the earlier empirical studies on the EMH 
have been conducted using the US data as US markets are probably the most developed 
capital markets in the world where they can provide  testing ground which is in favour of 
EMH.  Interest in market efficiency of smaller stock markets outside the United States 
has rapidly increased in the 1970s. Despite the variety of works on the EMH, the 
discussion below indicates that the findings are far from unanimity. Especially in recent 
years, market inefficiencies or anomalies were documented by researchers and they are 
not explicable by the EMH.  Thus, this raises the question of whether the EMH is still 
alive and also questions about the implications of these findings to the academicians as 
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well as the practitioners. 
 
2.4.1. Evidence Supporting the EMH 
The origins of the EMH can be traced back as far as the pioneering theoretical 
contributions of Bachelier (1900) and Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson (1965). They 
postulates that speculative prices are generated by a random process. In other words, the 
successive price changes were essentially random in character. The earlier studies which 
provide the most significant contributions were Working (1964) and Kendall (1964). 
They conclude that past price changes do not provide any information about future price 
changes.  Following the same line of thinking, other studies [eg. Alexander (1964), 
Moore (1964) and Robert (1964)] continue to provide evidence which is consistent with 
the findings of the earlier scholars. However, the early studies contain extensive 
empirical analysis without much underlying theory. 
 Since Fama published his work in 1965 and coined the term EMH, a vast 
majority of studies were carried out subsequently to investigate the behaviour of stock 
prices based on the EMH.  Fama (1965) examines the correlation between the current 
and previous return of a stock, using a sample of thirty Dow Jones industrial stocks. He 
finds statistically significant serial correlation coefficients, but weak in economic 
significance as they were relatively too small to compensate the transaction costs 
incurred. In 1970, Fama provides a comprehensive review of the theory and evidence of 
market efficiency. In his paper, he proceeds from theory to empirical work but it is 
clearly noted that most of the empirical works, in fact, preceded the development of the 
theory.  
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 Jensen (1968) examines the performance of the mutual funds for the period of 
1945 through 1964 and provides evidence that mutual funds achieved approximately 
zero percent of risk-adjusted returns each year. This implies that they do not demonstrate 
any powerful ability in selecting valuable stocks. 
 Castanias (1979) questions the validity of stock market efficiency. He computes 
the volatility of the market factor and the forty-five stocks around the dates where the 
information about macroeconomic variables is released. The volatility is measured as a 
ratio of the variance of stock returns on the dates where information is released and the 
variance of stock returns on all the other days (i.e. the dates on which this information is 
not released). The results demonstrate that the market appears to incorporate specific 
macro information into the prices of all stocks, suggesting that markets in aggregate may 
be efficient in processing the information. Subsequent to the work of Castanias (1979), 
similar results were obtained by Dawson (1984) who examines the trend toward market 
efficiency in the Hong Kong stock exchange. 
 Cooper (1974) uses spectral analysis to examine the relationship between money 
and stock prices. His study is based on the  monthly data over the period 1947 to 1970. 
His finding also provides evidence in support of the efficient market hypotheses. 
Hamburger and Kochin (1972) conduct a similar study on the relation between money 
and stock prices. Their results suggest that it is very unlikely that investors could earn 
excess returns in the stock market. The evidence provided by Cooper (1974) is 
consistent with the findings of Jensen and Bennington (1970). 
 Jensen and Bennington (1970) employ Levy’s filter rule to investigate the 
validity of the efficient market hypothesis. They use data for the period 1931 to 1965 
and divide their sample into 29 independent sub-samples. The evidence shows that the 
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filter rules do not significantly earn, on average, more than the buy and hold policy after 
making adjustment for transaction costs. This is contrary to Levy’s findings.  
 Kraft and Kraft (1977) examine the causal relationship between stock prices and 
several variables namely money supply, rate of  change of money supply, corporate 
interest rate, and a measure of risk. In their study, the Granger causality technique, Sim’s 
filter and their own version of Sim’s filter are employed. The results show that there is 
no causal relationship between stock prices and the abovementioned variables. This is in 
line with earlier works such as those by Hamburger and Kochin (1972).  
 Many research studies have also examined announcement of company-specific 
events, including mergers and acquisitions, seasoned equity offerings, spin offs, 
dividend and earnings announcement, etc to determine whether the market reacts as 
predicted by the efficient market hypothesis. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) 
examine the stock price reaction around stock splits. Many investors believe that stock 
splits resemble good news because dividend may increase following the stock splits. 
However, they observe no evidence of abnormal stock price performance, This suggests 
that investors would not be able to earn abnormal profits by purchasing the stock on the 
split date. The evidence is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. A similar 
study is conducted by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) but on a different event. In their 
study, Keown and Pinkerton determine  the stock price changes of target companies 
around  the announcement of takeover attempts. The findings show that there is a small 
upward shift in price prior to the announcement, suggesting that some information may 
leak out. However, the stock price changes are, on average, close to zero after the 
announcement. This result is consistent with efficient market hypothesis since it 
suggests that the effect of the information is absorbed immediately.  
